SECURITY

Charles Trinh — HIPAA Security Risk Analysis | Las Vegas, NV · Las Vegas, Nevada · Henderson · Clark County, Nevada · North Las Vegas, Nevada

A service card reading HIPAA SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS — asset inventory, threat model and a remediation register
Charles Trinh — HIPAA Security Risk Analysis

A Security Risk Analysis under the HIPAA Security Rule names every system holding ePHI, the threats each one carries and the gaps still open. I build one an OCR investigator can read line by line rather than a template with a date on it.

The finding OCR reaches for first

The most common finding against a covered entity is a risk analysis that exists on paper and nowhere else. OCR has said repeatedly that an organisation can violate the HIPAA Security Rule while holding a completed template, because the template never names a single system the organisation actually runs. Most enforcement settlements in recent years cite that exact gap beside a data-disclosure failure, and the template itself becomes part of the evidence against the organisation.

The second failure is scope. Teams assess the EHR and stop, leaving the backup appliance, the imaging archive, the cloud bucket holding exported claims and the marketing site's contact form outside the boundary. Anything that creates, receives, maintains or transmits ePHI belongs in scope, including systems you do not administer yourself but allow to transmit into yours. Each excluded system is either a deliberate decision with a written reason or an omission to correct before the review closes.

I write each register entry as a sentence someone can act on: this asset, this threat, this existing control, this residual likelihood, this owner and this date. When an investigator asks how the analysis drove a particular security decision, the entry answers without a meeting. That traceability between analysis and operating control is what separates a living risk process from a document produced once and filed, and it is the difference the settlements turn on.

Building the inventory before anything else

No analysis is better than the inventory it is built from. I walk the technical estate rather than the org chart, starting from network flows, DNS records and cloud billing exports instead of a wish list of departments. Each host, database, queue, storage bucket and third-party endpoint that touches ePHI receives an entry with an owner, a data classification and a physical or logical location. If I cannot place the data, the analysis cannot protect it.

This is where the awkward conversations happen. An analyst's laptop syncing a patient spreadsheet into a consumer cloud account belongs on the list. A contractor's billing portal receiving eligibility requests belongs on it. A decommissioned server still reachable on an old VLAN belongs on it until someone proves the disk was wiped. Each of those has appeared in at least one engagement, and almost none of them had a named owner who believed the system was theirs.

The inventory then becomes a gate for new systems. A service is not admitted to production without a risk-analysis entry reviewed by the security owner. That one rule prevents the drift that turns a thorough analysis into a stale document within two quarters. I also reconcile the inventory against the cloud and network estate each quarter, because drift is normal and a scheduled reconciliation is far cheaper than an investigation that begins with the question of what was running.

Threat and control reasoning that holds

For each asset I reason through the threats that plausibly apply rather than every threat in a catalogue. Ransomware against a database with no tested restore, credential stuffing against a patient portal with no lockout, an over-privileged service account inside a workflow engine, a storage bucket with public read, a printer configuration client that anyone on the network can reach without a password: these are concrete, and each has a control that exists or does not. A catalogue that lists every threat evenly teaches nobody where to spend.

Likelihood and impact are scored with a written rubric, so two analysts reach similar numbers and a finding's score can be explained years later and challenged on substance rather than memory. The rubric lives with the register rather than in a methodology PDF nobody opens, and I review scores against peer benchmarks where available, which usually reorders the remediation queue. A score that cannot be explained is a score that will be argued away in the first meeting that needs the budget.

Where a control is claimed, I ask for the artefact that proves it operates. A backup policy is not a backup; a restore log with a date and a row count is. Each claimed control carries an evidence reference beside it so the claim is testable. During the annual review those references are sampled, and any entry that cannot produce fresh evidence is reopened rather than re-dated, which is the single practice that keeps the register from becoming decoration over time.

Owners, dates and the remediation plan

A finding without an owner is a wish. Every gap in the register gets a named person, a due date and, where it will not be fixed, a written risk acceptance signed by someone with authority to accept it. The acceptance states why the risk is tolerable, what compensating control reduces it and when the decision will be revisited. A perpetual acceptance is a refusal to fix the problem dressed up as a management decision, and it is the first thing an examiner reads.

I sequence remediation by the exposure it removes, not by the effort it takes. Multi-factor authentication on remote administration, tested restores, removal of dormant accounts and egress restrictions from the data tier usually rank above a policy rewrite, even when the rewrite looks easier. Each fix produces evidence that goes back into the register and closes the finding with a date and the matching artefact, so the register shows progress in the same language the finding was written in.

The plan is reported monthly to whoever can fund the work, with a short list of items blocked on money, on a vendor or on a person. A risk analysis nobody with budget reads has satisfied only the form of the rule. OCR has consistently treated documentation first created during an investigation, after a breach notice, as a sign the process was never real, which is why the monthly report is short, dated and kept where an examiner can find it.

Connecting to the rest of the safeguards

The analysis has to connect to the other obligations under the Security Rule: the policies that govern the controls, the training that makes them effective and the sanctions process for staff who bypass them. I map each remediation to the safeguard category it serves, so the annual review is a walk through linked evidence rather than a fresh start every time. That mapping also lets one piece of evidence serve HITRUST or SOC 2 later without rebuilding the whole control set.

Where the organisation runs on cloud infrastructure, the analysis pulls in the shared-responsibility split. Relying on a provider's attestation without knowing which controls it covers and which remain yours is a common gap I flag explicitly. My own AWS work runs under an active business associate agreement, and I still check the boundary between provider and customer services line by line, because AWS's HIPAA eligibility covers a defined service list and not everything that carries an Amazon logo.

Incident response, contingency planning and vendor risk are cross-referenced, not duplicated. The analysis is the hub: it points at those documents and expects them to stay current, and it is reviewed whenever a system enters or leaves the estate and at least once a year. The cross-reference is also the quickest way to prove the programme is operated as a programme rather than as four documents written by four different people at four different times with four different owner lists.

The annual review that is not a copy-paste

The rule expects periodic review, and the honest way to do it is to re-test claims rather than re-date the document. Each review samples controls on the register, gathers fresh evidence and updates scores where the estate has changed. An unchanged score sitting beside an unchanged evidence reference is usually a sign the review did not happen. I ask the analyst to show how the last review changed the plan, because a review that changed nothing is a review of a document that works only by coincidence.

I keep a change log inside the register: systems added, systems retired, findings closed with evidence and findings reopened. That log is what a regulator reads to see whether the organisation operates the process between reviews or only on the review date. It is short, dated and boring by design, and it is the single most useful artefact if a breach investigation begins a year later and somebody needs to know what the organisation believed when it made its last big decision.

When a real event occurs, a lost laptop, a phishing success or a misconfigured rule, it becomes a new register entry with its cause and the resulting control change. The risk analysis then reflects learning rather than a filing cabinet. That loop from incident back into risk is the difference between an organisation that improves between reviews and one that repeats the same mistakes, and it is visible to anyone who reads the change log with a date beside each entry.

Procurement, and the contracts that decide your scope

The risk analysis and the procurement process meet at the point a new system is bought. A contract that names HIPAA obligations, a BAA that attaches to the right account and a security questionnaire answered with evidence are what prevent a new purchase from widening scope without anyone noticing. I work with procurement so the questions are asked before the purchase order is issued, not after the system is live and quietly collecting a patient history.

The clauses that most affect the analysis are the data-location clause, the subcontractor flow-down, the breach-notification window and the return or destruction obligation at termination. A cloud service that stores data in a region outside the United States without a documented reason is a scope change for the analysis, not a footnote. I write those requirements into the buying template so every vendor faces them and every exception is deliberate rather than accidental and discovered during an audit.

On delivery, the analysis entry for the new system is created from the contract and the questionnaire rather than the marketing page. The owner named at procurement becomes the owner on the register. That continuity is what stops a system entering the estate with no security record and emerging only when an incident asks why nobody had mapped it, and it is the point at which procurement stops being a purchasing function and becomes a security control.

The evidence pack an examiner asks for

When an investigator asks for the risk analysis, they rarely ask for the document alone. They ask for the register, the remediation plan, the evidence index, the last review record and, if there has been a breach, the entries that changed as a result. I assemble that pack as a routine output of the programme rather than a special effort under pressure. A pack that takes minutes to produce reads as an operating process; one assembled over a week reads as a response.

The evidence index is the most underrated artefact. It maps each claimed control to the artefact that proves it operates, with a date and a source. The examiner samples two or three entries and, if they resolve to real records, the rest of the index earns credibility. An index that resolves to stale or missing evidence costs more than having no index at all, because it invites a wider sweep of the register and a longer look at everything else.

I also keep the decision log: scope decisions, accepted risks and the rationale for each. Examinations often turn on whether the organisation reasoned carefully or merely ticked boxes, and the decision log is where careful reasoning becomes visible. It is written in the same month the decision was made, not reconstructed when the request arrives, and that timing is what gives it weight when somebody asks why a system was left out of scope.

What you keep and who runs it

You keep an asset inventory with owners, a scored finding register, a signed remediation plan with dates and an evidence index that references each claimed control. The documents belong to the organisation, not to a vendor cloud, and they are readable without specialist tooling. I hand them over with a short explanation of how to read each column, so the next analyst or consultant can pick up where I left off without having to rebuild the logic from scratch.

The operating owner is usually a named security lead, which in a small organisation is often the founder or the compliance officer carrying several hats. I hand over a review calendar and a one-page summary for the board, so the person carrying that load is not doing the analysis twice each year. Link the analysis to HIPAA security and to AWS HIPAA architecture where cloud is involved.

Typical effort for a small to mid-sized organisation is three to six weeks, front-loaded on inventory, with the register and plan running in parallel. The recurring cost is the review cycle, measured in days once the register exists. The most expensive part is not the analysis itself but the remediation that follows, which is why the plan is written to what the organisation can actually fund and staff rather than to the ideal that nobody has time to build.

Proof

  • ONC (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — public suite URL
  • 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, one AWS account
  • 104 clearinghouse enrolments across 53 jurisdictions
  • USCDI v7 proposal — Patient Digital Identity Credential — listed at isp.healthit.gov
  • SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564
  • AWS Business Associate Addendum active since 18 August 2026

Where this work is delivered

Engagements run from Las Vegas and reach across the valley: clients in Las Vegas, NV; Las Vegas, Nevada; Henderson; Clark County, Nevada; and North Las Vegas, Nevada — plus remote delivery nationwide.

How an engagement runs

1. Trace one real case

Follow a single patient or claim end to end with a timestamp at every hop, before any document is written.

2. Written findings

A findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date.

3. Monthly review

Review the list monthly and check whether the dates held.

Frequently asked

What is this service?

This page describes charles trinh — hipaa security risk analysis — the scope, the failure modes it prevents and how the work is measured. It sits in the Security and Compliance category at trinh.io.

Where is the work delivered?

Engagements run from Las Vegas, Nevada across the valley — Las Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, Spring Valley, Paradise, Winchester, Sunrise Manor, Enterprise, Summerlin, Clark County — and remotely anywhere in the United States. On-site work in the Las Vegas valley, remote delivery elsewhere.

What does it cost?

Standard rate $195 per hour, committed $165 per hour at twenty hours or more per week for three months or more; $1,600 standard day, $1,350 committed day. Scoped in writing before work starts, fixed fee where the deliverable is defined.

Who is Charles Trinh?

A technology architect in Las Vegas, Nevada, working in healthcare identity, consent and interoperability. Not a physician, not a medical practice, and not affiliated with any other Charles Trinh.

How does an engagement start?

With one trace of a real case and a written findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date. The first call is twenty minutes and free: 702-559-3489.

Engagement

Scoped in writing before work starts; fixed fee where the deliverable is defined. First call is 20 minutes and free. 702-559-3489 · charles@trinh.io

Talk to Charles

Record

Profile

Healthcare technology architect working where federal regulation becomes production infrastructure. Built and operates a FHIR R4 clinical platform — SMART App Launch authorization server, patient and provider portals, SQLite — on a hardened single-host AWS estate of 67 public hostnames. The platform returned a self-test PASS on the ONC (g)(10) Standardized API test suite in April 2026, 317 of 317 subtests, publicly verifiable. Designed a consent architecture in which a permissioned ledger records patient grant, refusal and revocation as immutable events while all clinical data stays off-chain and encrypted per patient — no PHI on the ledger by design. Filed a proposed USCDI v7 data element with ONC on verifiable patient identity. Translates the Federal Register, HHS/CMS guidance and HITRUST requirements into architecture, controls and audit evidence.

Selected engineering scale

  • Self-managed estate of 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, on one AWS account.
  • FHIR R4 API with a SMART App Launch authorization server; patient and provider portals; an AI service layer; Hyperledger Fabric peer, orderer and CA; IPFS; a 337-table SQLite clinical store.
  • Two permissioned distributed ledgers in production, one operating a consent registry that records grant, refusal and revocation with no PHI on chain.
  • X12 005010 pipelines across eight transaction sets.
  • Designed, built, deployed and operated end to end by one person.

Credentials and standards work

  • Inferno (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — the ONC Standardized API test suite. Standards validated: US Core 6.1.0, USCDI v3, SMART App Launch 2.0.0, Bulk Data 2.0.0. Public suite URL.
  • USCDI v7 public comment submission, April 2026 — proposed Patient Digital Identity Credential under the Provenance data class, listed publicly on the ONC Interoperability Standards Platform.
  • SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564. AWS Business Associate Addendum active 18 August 2026.

Technical environment

AWS us-east-1 (compute, storage, messaging, SMS, email, voice) · Linux and systemd hardening · nginx · Fabric and EVM ledgers · FHIR R4 · X12 005010 · HL7 · SQLite · self-hosted mail, drive, search and monitoring · Git-based change control and CI release gates.

TRINH — Charles Trinh, technology architect
TRINH

Charles Trinh

Fractional CTO/CIO and Technology Architect — Healthcare Data, Identity & Regulated Infrastructure · Las Vegas, NV

Las Vegas, Nevada · US citizen · Fractional and project engagements

(702) 559-3489 Email Charles Trinh