AWS HIPAA ARCHITECTURE
AWS HIPAA Architecture, Las Vegas NV

HIPAA-eligible AWS architecture on a single account under a business associate agreement: network boundaries, encryption, logging, and the evidence each control produces.
The eligible services question
Only a subset of AWS services may handle PHI under the business associate agreement, and the subset changes with the agreement, not with the service's popularity.
In practice this is where most programmes lose time: the decision is either never made explicitly or made once and never revisited. Naming the owner, the artefact and the review date converts it from an opinion into a control that can be tested.
Test it deliberately before it matters. A control that has never been exercised under adversarial conditions is a hypothesis, and in a regulated estate the difference between the two is discovered at the worst possible moment.
One account or many
Separation is a control only when it produces a real boundary; accounts divided for tidiness multiply the work of keeping encryption, logging and access consistent.
In practice this is where most programmes lose time: the decision is either never made explicitly or made once and never revisited. Naming the owner, the artefact and the review date converts it from an opinion into a control that can be tested.
Test it deliberately before it matters. A control that has never been exercised under adversarial conditions is a hypothesis, and in a regulated estate the difference between the two is discovered at the worst possible moment.
Network boundary
A private subnet is not a security control on its own; what matters is which paths exist into it, who holds credentials for them, and whether every path is logged.
In practice this is where most programmes lose time: the decision is either never made explicitly or made once and never revisited. Naming the owner, the artefact and the review date converts it from an opinion into a control that can be tested.
Test it deliberately before it matters. A control that has never been exercised under adversarial conditions is a hypothesis, and in a regulated estate the difference between the two is discovered at the worst possible moment.
Encryption and key custody
Encryption at rest is table stakes; key custody is the decision, because whoever can decrypt is whoever the data is ultimately entrusted to.
In practice this is where most programmes lose time: the decision is either never made explicitly or made once and never revisited. Naming the owner, the artefact and the review date converts it from an opinion into a control that can be tested.
Test it deliberately before it matters. A control that has never been exercised under adversarial conditions is a hypothesis, and in a regulated estate the difference between the two is discovered at the worst possible moment.
Logging that answers questions
CloudTrail and flow logs are not evidence until someone has queried them for a specific question and got a specific answer within an hour.
In practice this is where most programmes lose time: the decision is either never made explicitly or made once and never revisited. Naming the owner, the artefact and the review date converts it from an opinion into a control that can be tested.
Test it deliberately before it matters. A control that has never been exercised under adversarial conditions is a hypothesis, and in a regulated estate the difference between the two is discovered at the worst possible moment.
The evidence pack
Every control needs an artefact with a date: the configuration export, the policy attachment, the log query, the restore test result.
In practice this is where most programmes lose time: the decision is either never made explicitly or made once and never revisited. Naming the owner, the artefact and the review date converts it from an opinion into a control that can be tested.
Test it deliberately before it matters. A control that has never been exercised under adversarial conditions is a hypothesis, and in a regulated estate the difference between the two is discovered at the worst possible moment.
Cost-controlled single-account design
A regulated estate runs lean when services are chosen for the control they provide rather than the abstraction they offer.
In practice this is where most programmes lose time: the decision is either never made explicitly or made once and never revisited. Naming the owner, the artefact and the review date converts it from an opinion into a control that can be tested.
Test it deliberately before it matters. A control that has never been exercised under adversarial conditions is a hypothesis, and in a regulated estate the difference between the two is discovered at the worst possible moment.
Operability without a platform team
Backups, restores, certificates and monitoring all need a named owner and a runbook before the estate grows past one person's memory.
In practice this is where most programmes lose time: the decision is either never made explicitly or made once and never revisited. Naming the owner, the artefact and the review date converts it from an opinion into a control that can be tested.
Test it deliberately before it matters. A control that has never been exercised under adversarial conditions is a hypothesis, and in a regulated estate the difference between the two is discovered at the worst possible moment.
The controls that actually carry the argument
Encryption, logging and access are table stakes and every regulated estate claims them. The controls that survive an examination are the ones with an artefact: the configuration export, the policy attachment, the log query that answered a specific question, the restore result with a date.
Build the evidence pack alongside the architecture rather than afterwards. A control documented from memory six months later is a description of intent, and the gap between intent and configuration is where the findings live.
Key custody is the decision underneath encryption. Whoever can decrypt is whoever the data is ultimately entrusted to, and a customer-managed key in the same account as the data is a boundary in name only.
One account, read honestly
A single-account estate is cheaper to operate and easier to audit when the boundary between production and everything else is enforced by policy rather than described by naming. It fails when the same role can reach both, and then the separation is an illusion with a diagram behind it.
Test the boundary by attempting the forbidden action with the non-production credential. If it succeeds, the blast radius is the account regardless of how the environments are labelled.
Choose services for the control they provide rather than the abstraction they offer. A regulated estate runs lean when an unmanaged service with a clear audit path beats a managed one whose data flow you cannot describe.
Logging is not evidence until someone queried it
CloudTrail, flow logs and access logs exist in almost every regulated estate. The question is whether anyone has asked a specific question of them and got a specific answer within the hour — who deleted this, what changed on that policy, which host spoke to that endpoint.
Run the query as a rehearsal, before an incident. The gaps that appear are usually retention, a missing field, or a service whose logs go somewhere nobody federates.
Then attach the query to the control it evidences, with its date. A control with an artefact is a fact; a control without one is a paragraph in a document that an examiner will ask about.
What to build first on an empty account
Identity, then logging, then key custody, then the network boundary, then the workload. Each of the first four is a control the workload will inherit, and building them after the workload means retrofitting evidence onto a system that already handles PHI.
Write the evidence pack as you go: the configuration export with a date, the policy attachment, the log query that answered a question. Six months later these are the artefacts nobody can reconstruct from memory.
Then test the boundary: attempt the forbidden action with the wrong credential and confirm refusal. A boundary that has never been tested is a diagram.
Where this work is delivered
Engagements run from Las Vegas and reach across the valley: clients in Las Vegas, NV; Las Vegas, Nevada; Henderson; Clark County, Nevada; and North Las Vegas, Nevada — plus remote delivery nationwide. Las Vegas, Nevada 89101.
How an engagement runs
1. Trace one real case
Follow a single patient or claim end to end with a timestamp at every hop, before any document is written.
2. Written findings
A findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date.
3. Monthly review
Review the list monthly and check whether the dates held.
Frequently asked
What is this service?
This page describes aws hipaa architecture, las vegas nv — the scope, the failure modes it prevents and how the work is measured. It sits in the Security and Compliance category at trinh.io.
Where is the work delivered?
Engagements run from Las Vegas, Nevada across the valley — Las Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, Spring Valley, Paradise, Winchester, Sunrise Manor, Enterprise, Summerlin, Clark County — and remotely anywhere in the United States. On-site work in the Las Vegas valley, remote delivery elsewhere.
What does it cost?
Standard rate $195 per hour, committed $165 per hour at twenty hours or more per week for three months or more; $1,600 standard day, $1,350 committed day. Scoped in writing before work starts, fixed fee where the deliverable is defined.
Who is Charles Trinh?
A technology architect in Las Vegas, Nevada, working in healthcare identity, consent and interoperability. Not a physician, not a medical practice, and not affiliated with any other Charles Trinh.
How does an engagement start?
With one trace of a real case and a written findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date. The first call is twenty minutes and free: 702-559-3489.
Engagement
Available for architecture review, conformance work and fractional leadership. Standard rate $195 per hour, committed $165 per hour at twenty hours or more per week for three months or more.
Talk to Charles
Proof
- ONC (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — public suite URL
- 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, one AWS account
- 104 clearinghouse enrolments across 53 jurisdictions
- USCDI v7 proposal — Patient Digital Identity Credential — listed at isp.healthit.gov
- SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564
- AWS Business Associate Addendum active since 18 August 2026
Record
Profile
Healthcare technology architect working where federal regulation becomes production infrastructure. Built and operates a FHIR R4 clinical platform — SMART App Launch authorization server, patient and provider portals, SQLite — on a hardened single-host AWS estate of 67 public hostnames. The platform returned a self-test PASS on the ONC (g)(10) Standardized API test suite in April 2026, 317 of 317 subtests, publicly verifiable. Designed a consent architecture in which a permissioned ledger records patient grant, refusal and revocation as immutable events while all clinical data stays off-chain and encrypted per patient — no PHI on the ledger by design. Filed a proposed USCDI v7 data element with ONC on verifiable patient identity. Translates the Federal Register, HHS/CMS guidance and HITRUST requirements into architecture, controls and audit evidence.
Selected engineering scale
- Self-managed estate of 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, on one AWS account.
- FHIR R4 API with a SMART App Launch authorization server; patient and provider portals; an AI service layer; Hyperledger Fabric peer, orderer and CA; IPFS; a 337-table SQLite clinical store.
- Two permissioned distributed ledgers in production, one operating a consent registry that records grant, refusal and revocation with no PHI on chain.
- X12 005010 pipelines across eight transaction sets.
- Designed, built, deployed and operated end to end by one person.
Credentials and standards work
- Inferno (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — the ONC Standardized API test suite. Standards validated: US Core 6.1.0, USCDI v3, SMART App Launch 2.0.0, Bulk Data 2.0.0. Public suite URL.
- USCDI v7 public comment submission, April 2026 — proposed Patient Digital Identity Credential under the Provenance data class, listed publicly on the ONC Interoperability Standards Platform.
- SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564. AWS Business Associate Addendum active 18 August 2026.
Technical environment
AWS us-east-1 (compute, storage, messaging, SMS, email, voice) · Linux and systemd hardening · nginx · Fabric and EVM ledgers · FHIR R4 · X12 005010 · HL7 · SQLite · self-hosted mail, drive, search and monitoring · Git-based change control and CI release gates.