DATA

Charles Trinh — Healthcare Data Governance | Las Vegas, NV · Las Vegas, Nevada · Henderson · Clark County, Nevada · North Las Vegas, Nevada

Governance structure showing council, domain stewards and decision log across clinical and analytical domains
Charles Trinh — Healthcare Data Governance

Governance is the set of decisions made about data, the people who make them, and the record of what was decided. When those three are absent, every data question becomes an argument.

What governance is, and is not

Governance is not a committee that meets quarterly. Governance is the set of decisions made about data, with the right people in the room to make each one, and a record of what was decided. A governance committee that cannot decide whether a patient is counted once per encounter or once per episode is not a governance body; it is a place where questions go to wait. I separate governance from data engineering, from security, and from IT, and I write the boundaries explicitly.

A working governance design begins with a data ownership model. Every data domain has a single accountable owner at a senior level, even when the data is produced by several systems. The owner decides which source of truth is authoritative when two systems disagree, and the owner is responsible for the definition when a definition is contested. Below the owner, data stewards take care of the daily work: definitions, values, quality, access requests. The data quality work is the operational side of the same structure, and without stewards the owner becomes a queue.

The artefact that proves the structure works is a decision log. Every approved question, its decision, the decider, the date, and the rationale are recorded. When someone later asks why the same question is being reopened, the log points to the earlier answer and to the person to ask. Governance functions when the log is being read, not when the meeting agenda is being circulated. I include the log in the handover pack because the next owner's first week is decided by how quickly they can find the answers that were already given.

Decision rights and RACI that fit healthcare

Generic RACI covers decisions like "who owns the data" but misses the healthcare specifics. Who decides whether a new quality measure definition applies for the current reporting year? Who signs off on a patient cohort definition that affects a reported rate? Who decides when an external audit finding about data must be fixed in the source system versus in the warehouse? These are the questions that come up in practice, and the RACI must answer them for each domain.

I map decision rights to domains, not to individuals. A domain owner has central accountability but different teams make different decisions inside the domain. Clinical content decisions (what counts as a diagnosis for a measure) belong to the clinical domain; who can see it belongs to the privacy domain; how it is transformed belongs to the analytics domain. Splitting the decisions this way prevents one committee from becoming the bottleneck for all of them.

Some decisions cross domains and need an escalation route. When the privacy and the analytics decision conflict, the escalation route runs to the accountable executive. The route is documented, and the escalation body meets regularly. When escalations stall for months, governance is failing, and the failure is usually in the RACI rather than in the individuals. The RACI is reviewed annually, and whenever a new domain is added, because a new domain without a decision owner becomes the place the other domains push their contested questions to.

The data catalogue and its minimum

A catalogue is necessary and most catalogues are dead because they try to hold too much. The minimum viable catalogue covers: domain, owner, description, source-of-truth flag, sensitivity classification, retention rule, and last review date. Everything else is optional. A catalogue with a complete definition but no owner, or with a sensitivity classification but no retention rule, is a reference document that gets stale in a quarter.

I automate catalogue population from the warehouse schemas and the source system registries, so that the minimum is always populated from live systems. The owner and retention rule are written by the domain owner, and the review date fires when it lapses. When a new table appears without an owner, the catalogue entry is created as unowned and the queue routes to the owner of the containing schema. New things become visible, not invisible. The difference between a populated catalogue and a spreadsheet is whether anyone notices when a table is created outside the process.

The catalogue is the artefact the privacy officer, the security officer and the analytics owner use when someone asks "who can see this data and why". It answers in seconds; an idle catalogue makes the same question a week-long exercise with a spreadsheet, and in practice the question stops being asked because the answer is too slow to obtain., which is the moment the catalogue stops paying for its maintenance.

Access governance and consent

Catalogue entries are generated from the warehouse schemas and the source system registries, so the minimum is always populated from live systems. Ownership and retention are declared by the domain owner, and the review date fires when it lapses. A table appearing without an owner becomes an unowned entry queued to the owner of the containing schema. New things become visible, not invisible. A populated catalogue shows when a table is created outside the process; a spreadsheet never does.

Consent and authorisation are separate from access control and must be represented in the data itself. Where a patient has restricted disclosure to a particular provider, the restriction travels with the record. Where a research consent exists, the analytic access to that patient is scoped by the consent. The consent register is a governance artefact; I require it to be readable by access decisions in real time, not via weekly extracts. A weekly extract means a restriction set on Monday is violated until Friday, and the violation is real even if nobody has looked.

The HIPAA Security Rule's minimum necessary standard applies here. The HIPAA privacy and security gap work covers the baseline review. Governance decides on the minimum necessary for each role, and the system enforces it. A role that can read everything becomes the break-glass account, and the break-glass use is logged to the privacy officer every morning., and the grant period is enforced by the system, not by memory.

Research, secondary use, and data sharing

Secondary use is where governance frameworks most commonly break. Research access, analytics access, partner sharing and regulatory returns all have different rules, and each needs a written process. I write the process for each route: who requests, who reviews, what rules apply, what is recorded, how long the approval lasts, and what is reviewed at renewal., and the restriction is checked at query time against the consent register, not only at extraction.

Partner data sharing goes through a governance decision on the specific data, the specific recipient, and the specific purpose. A data sharing agreement followed by a generic "we share the data with our partner" dashboard behind the scenes is the common antipattern. The agreement document, the extracted data descriptor, and the sharing log are all visible to the privacy officer and to audit on request. The sharing log is the artefact I hand to a third-party risk review, and it is the one that most commonly reveals a share nobody in the room remembered approving.

De-identification for research and analytics sharing goes through the de-identification route described elsewhere, and the governance body signs off on the method and the residual risk. The decision is not delegated to the analyst who runs the tool. The de-identification work covers the methods; governance covers the acceptance of the residual risk and the record of which method was applied to which dataset. When a method is rejected, the decision log records the reason, so the same dataset is not proposed again with a different tool that produces the same residual.

Making governance stick after handover

A governance model is only real if it survives a staff change. The test is whether a new domain owner can read the RACI, the decision log and the catalogue and start working in a week. I build governance with the named successor visible for each role, and I include the handover documents in the pack. A governance structure that depends on one person's memory collapses the month they leave.

Meetings are short and the papers are published in advance. Every meeting has a decision log entry for every item. The meetings are not the governance; they are the synchronisation point. Decisions made between meetings are recorded and reviewed at the next meeting. When backchat decisions are visible, the record remains true and the log stays usable., which is a bar the log, the RACI and the catalogue have to pass together.

The governance design is reviewed annually with the data owners. The review covers: is the log being read, is the RACI still accurate, are the stewards' roles funded, are the access decisions timely. When the answers are negative the design needs adjusting; when they are positive the design holds. The analytics readiness work uses the same governance review as its starting point.

Proof

  • ONC (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — public suite URL
  • 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, one AWS account
  • 104 clearinghouse enrolments across 53 jurisdictions
  • USCDI v7 proposal — Patient Digital Identity Credential — listed at isp.healthit.gov
  • SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564
  • AWS Business Associate Addendum active since 18 August 2026

Where this work is delivered

Engagements run from Las Vegas and reach across the valley: clients in Las Vegas, NV; Las Vegas, Nevada; Henderson; Clark County, Nevada; and North Las Vegas, Nevada — plus remote delivery nationwide.

How an engagement runs

1. Trace one real case

Follow a single patient or claim end to end with a timestamp at every hop, before any document is written.

2. Written findings

A findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date.

3. Monthly review

Review the list monthly and check whether the dates held.

Frequently asked

What is this service?

This page describes charles trinh — healthcare data governance — the scope, the failure modes it prevents and how the work is measured. It sits in the Security and Compliance category at trinh.io.

Where is the work delivered?

Engagements run from Las Vegas, Nevada across the valley — Las Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, Spring Valley, Paradise, Winchester, Sunrise Manor, Enterprise, Summerlin, Clark County — and remotely anywhere in the United States. On-site work in the Las Vegas valley, remote delivery elsewhere.

What does it cost?

Standard rate $195 per hour, committed $165 per hour at twenty hours or more per week for three months or more; $1,600 standard day, $1,350 committed day. Scoped in writing before work starts, fixed fee where the deliverable is defined.

Who is Charles Trinh?

A technology architect in Las Vegas, Nevada, working in healthcare identity, consent and interoperability. Not a physician, not a medical practice, and not affiliated with any other Charles Trinh.

How does an engagement start?

With one trace of a real case and a written findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date. The first call is twenty minutes and free: 702-559-3489.

Engagement

Scoped in writing before work starts; fixed fee where the deliverable is defined. First call is 20 minutes and free. 702-559-3489 · charles@trinh.io

Talk to Charles

Record

Profile

Healthcare technology architect working where federal regulation becomes production infrastructure. Built and operates a FHIR R4 clinical platform — SMART App Launch authorization server, patient and provider portals, SQLite — on a hardened single-host AWS estate of 67 public hostnames. The platform returned a self-test PASS on the ONC (g)(10) Standardized API test suite in April 2026, 317 of 317 subtests, publicly verifiable. Designed a consent architecture in which a permissioned ledger records patient grant, refusal and revocation as immutable events while all clinical data stays off-chain and encrypted per patient — no PHI on the ledger by design. Filed a proposed USCDI v7 data element with ONC on verifiable patient identity. Translates the Federal Register, HHS/CMS guidance and HITRUST requirements into architecture, controls and audit evidence.

Selected engineering scale

  • Self-managed estate of 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, on one AWS account.
  • FHIR R4 API with a SMART App Launch authorization server; patient and provider portals; an AI service layer; Hyperledger Fabric peer, orderer and CA; IPFS; a 337-table SQLite clinical store.
  • Two permissioned distributed ledgers in production, one operating a consent registry that records grant, refusal and revocation with no PHI on chain.
  • X12 005010 pipelines across eight transaction sets.
  • Designed, built, deployed and operated end to end by one person.

Credentials and standards work

  • Inferno (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — the ONC Standardized API test suite. Standards validated: US Core 6.1.0, USCDI v3, SMART App Launch 2.0.0, Bulk Data 2.0.0. Public suite URL.
  • USCDI v7 public comment submission, April 2026 — proposed Patient Digital Identity Credential under the Provenance data class, listed publicly on the ONC Interoperability Standards Platform.
  • SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564. AWS Business Associate Addendum active 18 August 2026.

Technical environment

AWS us-east-1 (compute, storage, messaging, SMS, email, voice) · Linux and systemd hardening · nginx · Fabric and EVM ledgers · FHIR R4 · X12 005010 · HL7 · SQLite · self-hosted mail, drive, search and monitoring · Git-based change control and CI release gates.

TRINH — Charles Trinh, technology architect
TRINH

Charles Trinh

Fractional CTO/CIO and Technology Architect — Healthcare Data, Identity & Regulated Infrastructure · Las Vegas, NV

Las Vegas, Nevada · US citizen · Fractional and project engagements

(702) 559-3489 Email Charles Trinh