privacy rule · security rule · breach notification

Charles Trinh — HIPAA Privacy and Security Gap | Las Vegas, NV · Las Vegas, Nevada · Henderson · Clark County, Nevada · North Las Vegas, Nevada

A service card reading HIPAA GAP — policy, system and evidence brought into agreement
Charles Trinh — HIPAA Privacy and Security Gap

A HIPAA gap assessment is not a questionnaire. It is the difference between what the rule requires, what the organisation believes it does, and what the evidence would show an examiner on the day they asked.

What this is

The Security Rule requires administrative, physical and technical safeguards, and it requires them to be documented, reviewed and retained. The Privacy Rule governs use and disclosure, minimum necessary, and the accounting of disclosures. Most organisations can describe their controls. Far fewer can produce the artefact that proves a control operated on a specific date.

The gap that matters most is not a missing control. It is a control that exists in policy and not in practice, or in practice and not in policy. Both directions are findings. A firewall rule nobody documented is a finding. A documented review nobody performed is a worse one, because the documentation asserts something untrue.

Risk analysis is the second gap. The rule requires an accurate and thorough assessment of potential risks and vulnerabilities to confidentiality, integrity and availability. A risk register that lists generic threats without reference to the organisation's own systems does not satisfy that, and it is the single most common finding in enforcement actions.

Access management is the third. Unique user identification, emergency access procedure, automatic logoff and encryption are all addressable, which is widely misread as optional. Addressable means the organisation must assess whether it is reasonable and appropriate and document the decision either way. Doing nothing is not one of the permitted outcomes.

Finally, business associate management is where gaps compound. Every vendor touching PHI needs an agreement, and every agreement needs a scope that matches what the vendor actually does. An agreement signed for a billing service does not cover the same vendor hosting a patient portal.

There is a scope question that precedes all of this. The assessment has to establish what systems hold electronic protected health information, and that boundary is usually wider than the clinical systems the organisation thinks of first. Email, shared drives, backup media, mobile devices, vendor portals and the analytics stack all count, and each one is a place where a control may or may not exist.

Finally, the gap assessment is only useful if it is repeatable. A one-time exercise produces a report that ages from the day it is written. A control matrix with an owner and a review date per row produces a programme, and the programme is what an examiner is actually looking for when they ask how the organisation knows its controls are working.

The most common failure is a policy that describes a control nobody performs. It is worse than a missing policy, because it asserts something untrue and an examiner will test it. The remediation is either to perform the control or to change the policy, and both are legitimate outcomes.

A second failure is a risk analysis that lists generic threats. Without reference to the organisation's own systems and data flows it does not satisfy the rule, and it is the finding most frequently cited in enforcement.

A third is business associate scope drift. An agreement signed for one service does not cover a vendor that has since expanded into hosting or analytics, and the expansion is usually invisible until it is examined.

One further consideration is worth stating plainly: the assessment is not adversarial, and framing it that way produces defensiveness rather than remediation. The useful posture is that the rule describes a set of controls the organisation would want anyway, and the assessment is a way of finding the places where intent and practice have drifted apart. Organisations that take that posture close findings faster, because the people who own the controls are the people doing the finding.

A final note on scope: the assessment should cover the systems the organisation operates and the systems it depends on. A vendor that holds PHI under an agreement is in scope for the question of whether the agreement matches the use, even though the vendor operates its own controls. Drawing that line explicitly, rather than assuming the boundary is obvious, is what prevents the most common scope gap in the whole exercise.

How I do it

I start from the rule text rather than from a vendor questionnaire, and build a control matrix that maps each standard and implementation specification to the artefact that would evidence it. That matrix is the spine of the whole assessment.

From there I test each control against evidence rather than against assertion. A backup control is tested by restoring. A logging control is tested by querying for a specific event and seeing whether the answer exists. A review control is tested by asking for the minutes.

Gaps are recorded with three attributes: what the rule requires, what was observed, and what the remediation would be. That structure makes the report actionable rather than a list of concerns.

Risk analysis is rebuilt around the organisation's actual systems, with threats tied to specific assets and specific data flows. The output is a register that an examiner can follow from asset to threat to control to evidence.

Finally, I leave a remediation sequence ordered by risk and by effort, so the organisation can close the findings that matter first rather than the ones that are easiest to write a policy for.

Where the organisation has a cloud estate, I review the provider's business associate agreement against the services actually in use, because scope drift is common and invisible until it is examined.

The handover is the control matrix with owners and review dates, the gap register with remediation status, and the risk analysis as a living document. Those three artefacts are what turn an assessment into a programme.

The measure of a gap assessment is whether the organisation can answer a specific question with a specific artefact within an hour. When the control matrix has owners and review dates, the risk analysis is tied to real systems and the gap register carries remediation status, that answer exists. The report is the by-product; the programme is the deliverable.

The final point is about evidence. Every control the organisation claims to operate should produce an artefact with a date, and the assessment should confirm that the artefact exists rather than that the control is described. That single shift, from description to evidence, is what separates an assessment that survives examination from one that merely satisfies a checklist.

Artifacts you keep

  • A control matrix mapping each implementation specification to its evidence artefact
  • Tested controls with observed results rather than asserted compliance
  • A gap register recording requirement, observation and remediation
  • A risk analysis tied to actual assets and data flows
  • A remediation sequence ordered by risk and effort

Proof

  • AWS Business Associate Addendum active since 18 August 2026
  • ONC (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — public suite URL
  • 104 clearinghouse enrolments across 53 jurisdictions
  • 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, one AWS account
  • SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564

Engagement

Scoped in writing before work starts; fixed fee where the deliverable is defined. First call is 20 minutes and free. 702-559-3489 · charles@trinh.io

Proof

  • ONC (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — public suite URL
  • 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, one AWS account
  • 104 clearinghouse enrolments across 53 jurisdictions
  • USCDI v7 proposal — Patient Digital Identity Credential — listed at isp.healthit.gov
  • SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564
  • AWS Business Associate Addendum active since 18 August 2026

Where this work is delivered

Engagements run from Las Vegas and reach across the valley: clients in Las Vegas, NV; Las Vegas, Nevada; Henderson; Clark County, Nevada; and North Las Vegas, Nevada — plus remote delivery nationwide.

How an engagement runs

1. Trace one real case

Follow a single patient or claim end to end with a timestamp at every hop, before any document is written.

2. Written findings

A findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date.

3. Monthly review

Review the list monthly and check whether the dates held.

Frequently asked

What is this service?

This page describes charles trinh — hipaa privacy and security gap — the scope, the failure modes it prevents and how the work is measured. It sits in the Security and Compliance category at trinh.io.

Where is the work delivered?

Engagements run from Las Vegas, Nevada across the valley — Las Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, Spring Valley, Paradise, Winchester, Sunrise Manor, Enterprise, Summerlin, Clark County — and remotely anywhere in the United States. On-site work in the Las Vegas valley, remote delivery elsewhere.

What does it cost?

Standard rate $195 per hour, committed $165 per hour at twenty hours or more per week for three months or more; $1,600 standard day, $1,350 committed day. Scoped in writing before work starts, fixed fee where the deliverable is defined.

Who is Charles Trinh?

A technology architect in Las Vegas, Nevada, working in healthcare identity, consent and interoperability. Not a physician, not a medical practice, and not affiliated with any other Charles Trinh.

How does an engagement start?

With one trace of a real case and a written findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date. The first call is twenty minutes and free: 702-559-3489.

Engagement

Scoped in writing before work starts; fixed fee where the deliverable is defined. First call is 20 minutes and free. 702-559-3489 · charles@trinh.io

Talk to Charles

Record

Profile

Healthcare technology architect working where federal regulation becomes production infrastructure. Built and operates a FHIR R4 clinical platform — SMART App Launch authorization server, patient and provider portals, SQLite — on a hardened single-host AWS estate of 67 public hostnames. The platform returned a self-test PASS on the ONC (g)(10) Standardized API test suite in April 2026, 317 of 317 subtests, publicly verifiable. Designed a consent architecture in which a permissioned ledger records patient grant, refusal and revocation as immutable events while all clinical data stays off-chain and encrypted per patient — no PHI on the ledger by design. Filed a proposed USCDI v7 data element with ONC on verifiable patient identity. Translates the Federal Register, HHS/CMS guidance and HITRUST requirements into architecture, controls and audit evidence.

Selected engineering scale

  • Self-managed estate of 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, on one AWS account.
  • FHIR R4 API with a SMART App Launch authorization server; patient and provider portals; an AI service layer; Hyperledger Fabric peer, orderer and CA; IPFS; a 337-table SQLite clinical store.
  • Two permissioned distributed ledgers in production, one operating a consent registry that records grant, refusal and revocation with no PHI on chain.
  • X12 005010 pipelines across eight transaction sets.
  • Designed, built, deployed and operated end to end by one person.

Credentials and standards work

  • Inferno (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — the ONC Standardized API test suite. Standards validated: US Core 6.1.0, USCDI v3, SMART App Launch 2.0.0, Bulk Data 2.0.0. Public suite URL.
  • USCDI v7 public comment submission, April 2026 — proposed Patient Digital Identity Credential under the Provenance data class, listed publicly on the ONC Interoperability Standards Platform.
  • SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564. AWS Business Associate Addendum active 18 August 2026.

Technical environment

AWS us-east-1 (compute, storage, messaging, SMS, email, voice) · Linux and systemd hardening · nginx · Fabric and EVM ledgers · FHIR R4 · X12 005010 · HL7 · SQLite · self-hosted mail, drive, search and monitoring · Git-based change control and CI release gates.

TRINH — Charles Trinh, technology architect
TRINH

Charles Trinh

Fractional CTO/CIO and Technology Architect — Healthcare Data, Identity & Regulated Infrastructure · Las Vegas, NV

Las Vegas, Nevada · US citizen · Fractional and project engagements

(702) 559-3489 Email Charles Trinh