segmentation · routing · clinical networks
Charles Trinh — LAN, WAN and VLAN Design, Las Vegas NV

Network design for healthcare estates: segmentation that reflects clinical boundaries, WAN resilience that survives a carrier event, and change control that does not take a ward offline.
Segment by clinical boundary
VLANs exist to enforce policy, not for tidiness; the boundaries that matter are between clinical devices, corporate IT, guest access and building systems.
A flat network means a compromised infusion pump and a compromised laptop are the same incident; segmentation turns that into two.
Document why each VLAN exists and what is permitted across it, because undocumented segments become permanent.
Clinical device networks
Medical devices are frequently unpatchable, unsupported and invisible to IT. Put them on their own segment with strict egress rules and an inventory.
Identify by MAC and by clinical owner rather than by IP alone, since DHCP reshuffles addresses and breaks naive rules.
Monitor device-to-device traffic, because that is where unexpected behaviour appears first.
WAN resilience that means something
Two carriers is not redundancy if they share a conduit. Verify physical path diversity, and test failover rather than assuming it.
Design for degraded operation: what stops working when only one path survives, and is that acceptable for care.
Measure failover time and put the number in the runbook; a five-minute outage is a different clinical decision from a fifty-second one.
QoS and clinical traffic
Voice, imaging and clinical applications need priority; without it, a backup job can degrade a telemedicine consult.
Keep QoS policies simple enough to audit, because a twenty-class model nobody understands is worse than five classes that work.
Verify with measurements after every change, not with the configuration file.
Change control
Network changes are the most common cause of self-inflicted clinical outage; require a peer review, a rollback and a maintenance window that a clinician agreed to.
Take a configuration backup before every change and keep it retrievable without the network.
Post-change verification is part of the change, not a separate task.
Documentation that survives
One current diagram, one IP plan and one list of inter-VLAN rules, with a named owner and a review date.
Stale documentation is worse than none, because it is believed.
Review quarterly against the actual running configuration.
How I do it
One trace of a real case with timestamps at every hop, before any document is written.
A findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date, reviewed monthly.
No attestation I did not test, and no template sold as an assessment.
The flat network is the finding
Almost every healthcare estate that has grown rather than been designed has at least one segment where clinical devices, office computers and guest access share a broadcast domain. Finding it is not difficult if you look: enumerate the subnets, list what lives in each, and check what could reach what. The exercise takes a day and it produces the single most valuable diagram in the estate, because everything else about segmentation follows from knowing where the boundaries actually are rather than where they were planned.
Remediating a flat segment is a project in itself and it should be staged, because moving clinical devices is a change with a clinical risk. Sequence by risk and by dependency: building systems and guest access first, office computing second, clinical devices last and with a named clinical owner present. Each stage ends with a verification that the expected traffic still flows and the unexpected traffic still does not, recorded against the change so the next stage starts from evidence rather than from confidence.
Addressing and the IPv4 floor
Address space is an operational dependency that nobody notices until a new imaging suite needs a subnet and the only remaining block is in use by a laboratory instrument nobody has documented. Keep an IP plan with utilisation per subnet and a forecast against the estate's growth, and treat any subnet above eighty percent utilisation as a project rather than as a warning. The alternative is RFC 1918 exhaustion discovered during a construction project, which is the worst possible moment to redesign addressing.
Where the estate is large enough to justify it, dual-stack the perimeter and the new deployments rather than converting everything, because a wholesale conversion of clinical devices is not a project most organisations can absorb. Record which segments are dual-stacked and which are not, so the security posture is known rather than assumed. The pragmatic goal is that new growth does not consume the remaining IPv4 space, which buys the organisation the years it needs to retire devices rather than converting them.
Change control as clinical safety
A network change is a clinical intervention in everything but name, and the evidence for that is how often the outage during a maintenance window is worse than the problem the change was meant to fix. Require a written change with a rollback step, a named approver who understands the clinical impact, and a verification that includes a clinical application rather than only a ping. Where the change cannot be rolled back cleanly, the window should be a clinical decision rather than a technical one.
Keep configuration backups outside the network they describe, because the failure mode that requires a restore is often the network itself. Test the restore path annually, on a spare device, and record how long it takes to bring a segment back. An organisation that can restore a ward's network in fifteen minutes has a different conversation with its clinicians than one that measures the process in hours, and the difference is a backup nobody has verified versus one that has been.
Remote access and third parties
Vendor remote access is the most common unmanaged path into a clinical network, and the estate that has segmentation for its own traffic often has a flat exception for the imaging vendor's laptop. Inventory every remote access path, name the third party, the device, the purpose and the expiry, and require that each is time-bound and reviewed. Where a vendor needs persistent access, give it an appliance in its own segment with its own credentials and its own logging, never a shared pivot host, because that pivot host becomes the path between everything the segmentation was designed to separate.
Review the remote access inventory quarterly against the contracts that justified it, and remove the paths whose work has ended. The removals are usually a larger number than expected, because the ending of a project rarely triggers the revocation of its access. Record each revocation with the date and the person who confirmed it, both because it is evidence that the control operates and because the record itself discourages the informal paths from reappearing when the next project starts.
The diagram that people trust
A network diagram is trusted long after it stops being true, which is why it should carry a revision date and the name of the person who last verified it. Draw it from the running configuration rather than from memory, and reconcile it against the configuration every quarter. The reconciliation usually finds two devices nobody documented and one link that has been removed, and those findings are the reason the diagram remains useful rather than decorative. A diagram without a date is believed; one with a date is verified.
Proof
- ONC (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — public suite URL
- 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, one AWS account
- 104 clearinghouse enrolments across 53 jurisdictions
- USCDI v7 proposal — Patient Digital Identity Credential — listed at isp.healthit.gov
- SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564
- AWS Business Associate Addendum active since 18 August 2026
Where this work is delivered
Engagements run from Las Vegas and reach across the valley: clients in Las Vegas, NV; Las Vegas, Nevada; Henderson; Clark County, Nevada; and North Las Vegas, Nevada — plus remote delivery nationwide.
How an engagement runs
1. Trace one real case
Follow a single patient or claim end to end with a timestamp at every hop, before any document is written.
2. Written findings
A findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date.
3. Monthly review
Review the list monthly and check whether the dates held.
Frequently asked
What is this service?
This page describes charles trinh — lan, wan and vlan design, las vegas nv — the scope, the failure modes it prevents and how the work is measured. It sits in the AV and IT Infrastructure category at trinh.io.
Where is the work delivered?
Engagements run from Las Vegas, Nevada across the valley — Las Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, Spring Valley, Paradise, Winchester, Sunrise Manor, Enterprise, Summerlin, Clark County — and remotely anywhere in the United States. On-site work in the Las Vegas valley, remote delivery elsewhere.
What does it cost?
Standard rate $195 per hour, committed $165 per hour at twenty hours or more per week for three months or more; $1,600 standard day, $1,350 committed day. Scoped in writing before work starts, fixed fee where the deliverable is defined.
Who is Charles Trinh?
A technology architect in Las Vegas, Nevada, working in healthcare identity, consent and interoperability. Not a physician, not a medical practice, and not affiliated with any other Charles Trinh.
How does an engagement start?
With one trace of a real case and a written findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date. The first call is twenty minutes and free: 702-559-3489.
Engagement
Scoped in writing before work starts; fixed fee where the deliverable is defined. First call is 20 minutes and free. 702-559-3489 · charles@trinh.io
Talk to Charles
- Phone: 702-559-3489
- Email: charles@trinh.io
- Based in Las Vegas, Nevada · working remotely across the United States
Record
Profile
Healthcare technology architect working where federal regulation becomes production infrastructure. Built and operates a FHIR R4 clinical platform — SMART App Launch authorization server, patient and provider portals, SQLite — on a hardened single-host AWS estate of 67 public hostnames. The platform returned a self-test PASS on the ONC (g)(10) Standardized API test suite in April 2026, 317 of 317 subtests, publicly verifiable. Designed a consent architecture in which a permissioned ledger records patient grant, refusal and revocation as immutable events while all clinical data stays off-chain and encrypted per patient — no PHI on the ledger by design. Filed a proposed USCDI v7 data element with ONC on verifiable patient identity. Translates the Federal Register, HHS/CMS guidance and HITRUST requirements into architecture, controls and audit evidence.
Selected engineering scale
- Self-managed estate of 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, on one AWS account.
- FHIR R4 API with a SMART App Launch authorization server; patient and provider portals; an AI service layer; Hyperledger Fabric peer, orderer and CA; IPFS; a 337-table SQLite clinical store.
- Two permissioned distributed ledgers in production, one operating a consent registry that records grant, refusal and revocation with no PHI on chain.
- X12 005010 pipelines across eight transaction sets.
- Designed, built, deployed and operated end to end by one person.
Credentials and standards work
- Inferno (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — the ONC Standardized API test suite. Standards validated: US Core 6.1.0, USCDI v3, SMART App Launch 2.0.0, Bulk Data 2.0.0. Public suite URL.
- USCDI v7 public comment submission, April 2026 — proposed Patient Digital Identity Credential under the Provenance data class, listed publicly on the ONC Interoperability Standards Platform.
- SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564. AWS Business Associate Addendum active 18 August 2026.
Technical environment
AWS us-east-1 (compute, storage, messaging, SMS, email, voice) · Linux and systemd hardening · nginx · Fabric and EVM ledgers · FHIR R4 · X12 005010 · HL7 · SQLite · self-hosted mail, drive, search and monitoring · Git-based change control and CI release gates.