SECURITY
Charles Trinh — Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery | Las Vegas, NV · Las Vegas, Nevada · Henderson · Clark County, Nevada · North Las Vegas, Nevada

Business continuity planning answers what happens when the systems stop. I build continuity and recovery plans around clinical dependency, tested restores and tolerable downtime the organisation has actually measured rather than quietly assumed in a policy.
Continuity is a clinical question first
A business continuity plan for a healthcare organisation begins with clinical care, not servers. If the EHR is unavailable for an hour, what do clinicians do? If the pharmacy interface fails, how are prescriptions recorded and dispensed? If the network is down, how does the front desk admit a patient and how does the clinician document the visit? The answers belong in a downtime procedure the clinical staff have practised.
IT can restore systems quickly and still see harm if the clinical team does not know what to do during the gap. I work with clinical leadership to write the procedure and then to test it. The person who knows the manual process is not always the person who wrote the plan, and the exercise finds the difference before a real outage does, which is when the cost of the difference is highest.
Healthcare continuity questions rarely fit generic disaster-recovery templates. The organisation has to define which clinical services cannot tolerate downtime, which tolerate minutes and which can run for hours in manual mode. That classification drives everything downstream: the recovery objectives, the backup investment and the staff training all follow from it. A plan treating every system the same protects the wrong things first.
Recovery objectives tied to clinical tolerance
Recovery point objective and recovery time objective are easy to write and easy to ignore. A recovery point objective of fifteen minutes on a clinical database requires replication and a tested failover; a twenty-four-hour objective is a backup with a one-day data-loss window that a clinical team will treat as unacceptable in practice. I work through the objectives per system with the clinical owner and confirm the architecture can deliver them.
The honest conversation is about cost. A fifteen-minute objective for the patient portal may be expensive while a four-hour objective for an analytics warehouse may be perfectly adequate. I present the trade-off to the business owner, who decides which objective to buy. The plan then tells the technical team what is required, rather than pretending every system needs the same protection.
The objectives are published to the clinical owners of each application, so they know what to expect when a failure occurs. The organisation does not promise more than it can deliver, and when it does promise, the promise has an owner and a mechanism behind it. Publishing the objectives also stops a clinical team building its own workaround on an assumption that IT can restore in five minutes.
Backups that restore, not backups that exist
Most organisations believe they have backups. Far fewer have tested a restore that brought a production system back without manual intervention and with a known row count. The plan states the backup policy and, critically, the restore-test cadence and the evidence each test produces. A test without a record of the restored row count tests the restore tool rather than the data.
My restore testing covers the application, the database and the configuration needed to run it. A restored database with no matching application configuration is not a restore. I set up a documented dry-run procedure and treat a failed test as a finding with an owner and a fix date. I have seen organisations with a clean backup policy and a restore test that last succeeded two years earlier, usually after a storage migration.
I test restores into an isolated environment, because restoring over production is a common cause of secondary incidents. The isolated restore also proves the backup runs independently of production credentials that might themselves be lost. The isolation has to be genuine: the test environment must not reach back into production through the same identity provider that might be unavailable, or through the same network route the failure has already disrupted.
Manual procedures and communication
Manual downtime procedures should be short enough to follow under stress and available when the electronic record is not. I write one-page procedure cards for front desk, pharmacy, imaging and clinical staff, with the paper forms required, the acceptable ways to document care and the mechanism to enter the data back into the record later. The catch-up entry is the step organisations forget, and where records get duplicated after an outage.
Communication is part of continuity. The organisation needs to know who calls clinical teams, who notifies patients, who notifies payers and who notifies regulators. I draft the communication tree and test that the numbers work. A plan with correct procedures and no working phone tree is not a plan, and the failure appears at the exact moment when someone is trying to reach a clinician and finding an office number nobody answers.
I run the plan through the same tabletop method, with clinical and technical teams rehearsing together. Two separate exercises produce two separate plans, and the mismatch between them is discovered only during a real event. A joint session costs one extra meeting and removes that risk. The clinical team learns what IT can actually restore, and IT learns which clinical steps cannot wait for it.
Facilities, people and third parties
Continuity is not only technology. A clinic that cannot open because of a power outage, a flood or an unplanned early closure has a continuity problem the IT plan will not solve. I review the facility dependencies and document alternate sites, remote arrangements and staffing if the primary location is unavailable. The clinic closure is often the largest single disruption a small healthcare organisation will experience.
Third parties are part of the picture. A cloud provider outage, a clearinghouse outage or a payer portal outage is outside the organisation's control, but the plan still needs a response. The AWS estate I support runs under an active business associate agreement, and the continuity plan states the provider's outage posture and the organisation's response for each cloud dependency. The response may be to wait, but waiting is a decision the plan records.
I examine the people dependency as well. Many small organisations have one founder, one senior clinician or one system administrator holding critical knowledge. The plan names alternate contacts, cross-trains a second person and documents knowledge where the organisation can reach it. That documentation is also the most valuable handover an organisation can keep when a key person leaves without notice.
Procurement and contract language for recovery vendors
Continuity depends on contracts the organisation forgets until the moment it needs them. The data-centre contract, the hosting contract and the backup service contract each define the recovery the organisation can expect in a disaster. I review them for the recovery time they promise, the support tier that delivers it and the exclusions that apply during regional outages. A promised four-hour restoration is worth nothing if the support tier is not the one that delivers it.
The alternative-site contracts deserve the same attention. A mutual-aid agreement with another clinic, a co-location agreement or a remote-work plan each needs a written basis and a contact that works at the moment it is needed. I test the contact list and the site readiness as part of the exercise, because an alternative site that nobody has visited cannot be counted on in a crisis where the building is closed.
The contract for the clinical downtime supplies, covering paper forms, offline order sets and a fax line with a known number, is easy to overlook. These are low-cost items, and their absence causes the most visible disruption in the first hour of a clinical outage. I include them in the plan with the owner and the stock location, and I check they are current on a routine basis rather than when the first patient arrives.
Changes as the organisation grows
A continuity plan built for a single clinic does not survive the third location. Each new site introduces its own network dependency, its own clinical workflows and its own communication tree. I review the plan against the estate each time the business changes, and I add the new site, its critical systems and its clinical owner explicitly. Growth outpaces plan maintenance unless maintenance is built into the process that drives the growth.
The cloud footprint grows the same way. The AWS estate I support runs under an active business associate agreement, and each new workload added to it changes the recovery objectives the plan must meet. I tie the plan's review to the change that introduces the workload, so a new service does not enter production without a recovery objective and a restore test. That discipline is the difference between continuity and hope.
Finally, the plan's ownership transitions as the organisation grows. The founder who wrote it in year one may hand it to an operations director by year three. I write the plan so the new owner can operate it without the original author's memory, with a short guide, a calendar and a summary of the decisions behind each objective. Continuity documents need to outlive the people who first wrote them.
Exercising the plan and keeping it current
A continuity plan is tested, not written. Annual testing with a full exercise, plus quarterly restore tests for the most critical systems, is the cadence I recommend. Each exercise produces findings that go back into the plan, and I keep a change log so the version in force is unambiguous. The change log is short and dated, and it is the first thing a regulator or a buyer asks to see.
The plan is reviewed whenever the estate changes: a system is added, a major vendor replaced or a clinic opened. A plan written three years ago against an old environment will mislead when it matters. I tie the review to the security risk analysis cycle, so the two documents cannot drift apart and the recovery objectives stay aligned with the systems holding patient data today.
The deliverables are a continuity plan, manual downtime cards, recovery objectives and a tested restore schedule. I hand them to a named owner with a calendar and a status dashboard, so emergencies are exercises the organisation has chosen in advance rather than surprises. Recovery and continuity are unglamorous work, and that is exactly why they are the controls most often left untested until the day they matter.
The evidence pack a buyer or examiner opens
An examiner or a large payer reviewing continuity asks for the plan and then asks what was tested. I assemble a pack with the plan, the exercise record, the restore-test evidence and the recovery objectives with their dates. The pack answers the question of whether the plan is a document or a practice, and a pack without a dated exercise record fails the test on its first page.
The restore evidence is the part that earns trust. A backup policy states intent; a restore log with the date, the system, the restored row count and the person who ran it states fact. I include several restore records from the last year and the findings they produced. That history shows the organisation treats restores as routine and finds issues before a real failure does.
The pack also covers the clinical side. An examiner for a healthcare buyer cares whether the downtime procedure was rehearsed and whether the clinical staff know it exists. I include the procedure cards, the list of staff inducted on them and the date of the joint clinical and technical exercise. Recovery is a technical competence and a clinical one, and the pack shows both.
Proof
- ONC (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — public suite URL
- 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, one AWS account
- 104 clearinghouse enrolments across 53 jurisdictions
- USCDI v7 proposal — Patient Digital Identity Credential — listed at isp.healthit.gov
- SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564
- AWS Business Associate Addendum active since 18 August 2026
Where this work is delivered
Engagements run from Las Vegas and reach across the valley: clients in Las Vegas, NV; Las Vegas, Nevada; Henderson; Clark County, Nevada; and North Las Vegas, Nevada — plus remote delivery nationwide.
How an engagement runs
1. Trace one real case
Follow a single patient or claim end to end with a timestamp at every hop, before any document is written.
2. Written findings
A findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date.
3. Monthly review
Review the list monthly and check whether the dates held.
Frequently asked
What is this service?
This page describes charles trinh — business continuity and disaster recovery — the scope, the failure modes it prevents and how the work is measured. It sits in the Security and Compliance category at trinh.io.
Where is the work delivered?
Engagements run from Las Vegas, Nevada across the valley — Las Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, Spring Valley, Paradise, Winchester, Sunrise Manor, Enterprise, Summerlin, Clark County — and remotely anywhere in the United States. On-site work in the Las Vegas valley, remote delivery elsewhere.
What does it cost?
Standard rate $195 per hour, committed $165 per hour at twenty hours or more per week for three months or more; $1,600 standard day, $1,350 committed day. Scoped in writing before work starts, fixed fee where the deliverable is defined.
Who is Charles Trinh?
A technology architect in Las Vegas, Nevada, working in healthcare identity, consent and interoperability. Not a physician, not a medical practice, and not affiliated with any other Charles Trinh.
How does an engagement start?
With one trace of a real case and a written findings list naming the defect, the system, the owner and the date. The first call is twenty minutes and free: 702-559-3489.
Engagement
Scoped in writing before work starts; fixed fee where the deliverable is defined. First call is 20 minutes and free. 702-559-3489 · charles@trinh.io
Talk to Charles
- Phone: 702-559-3489
- Email: charles@trinh.io
- Based in Las Vegas, Nevada · working remotely across the United States
Record
Profile
Healthcare technology architect working where federal regulation becomes production infrastructure. Built and operates a FHIR R4 clinical platform — SMART App Launch authorization server, patient and provider portals, SQLite — on a hardened single-host AWS estate of 67 public hostnames. The platform returned a self-test PASS on the ONC (g)(10) Standardized API test suite in April 2026, 317 of 317 subtests, publicly verifiable. Designed a consent architecture in which a permissioned ledger records patient grant, refusal and revocation as immutable events while all clinical data stays off-chain and encrypted per patient — no PHI on the ledger by design. Filed a proposed USCDI v7 data element with ONC on verifiable patient identity. Translates the Federal Register, HHS/CMS guidance and HITRUST requirements into architecture, controls and audit evidence.
Selected engineering scale
- Self-managed estate of 67 public hostnames, 51 serving, on one AWS account.
- FHIR R4 API with a SMART App Launch authorization server; patient and provider portals; an AI service layer; Hyperledger Fabric peer, orderer and CA; IPFS; a 337-table SQLite clinical store.
- Two permissioned distributed ledgers in production, one operating a consent registry that records grant, refusal and revocation with no PHI on chain.
- X12 005010 pipelines across eight transaction sets.
- Designed, built, deployed and operated end to end by one person.
Credentials and standards work
- Inferno (g)(10) self-test PASS, 317 of 317 subtests, April 2026 — the ONC Standardized API test suite. Standards validated: US Core 6.1.0, USCDI v3, SMART App Launch 2.0.0, Bulk Data 2.0.0. Public suite URL.
- USCDI v7 public comment submission, April 2026 — proposed Patient Digital Identity Credential under the Provenance data class, listed publicly on the ONC Interoperability Standards Platform.
- SAM.gov UEI MVKQW9DKKGB8 · CAGE 20KM5 · NPI 1194645564. AWS Business Associate Addendum active 18 August 2026.
Technical environment
AWS us-east-1 (compute, storage, messaging, SMS, email, voice) · Linux and systemd hardening · nginx · Fabric and EVM ledgers · FHIR R4 · X12 005010 · HL7 · SQLite · self-hosted mail, drive, search and monitoring · Git-based change control and CI release gates.