HIPAA security failures are rarely exotic. They are encryption that was planned and not applied to one store, logging that proves nothing, and an access review nobody runs.
HIPAA security failures are rarely exotic. They are encryption that was planned and not applied to one store, logging that proves nothing, and an access review nobody runs.
The technical safeguards are small in number and specific: access control, audit controls, integrity, person or entity authentication, and transmission security. What makes an organisation fail is not misunderstanding them but applying them unevenly — the production database encrypted, the analytics snapshot not; the application logging every read, the batch job writing to a share with no audit trail at all.
I start with the data map, because every other control depends on it. Where is ePHI stored, who can read it, what copies exist, which ones are backed up and which are simply forgotten. In practice a mid-sized practice finds between five and fifteen stores it did not know were holding patient data, and every one of them is outside the controls the rest of the estate has.
The second pass is evidence. An auditor does not want a policy that says access is reviewed quarterly; they want the review record. Any control that cannot produce a record is treated as not implemented, which is the honest reading of the rule and the one that survives an investigation.
Delivered from a Nevada base: remote by default, on site across the Wasatch Front and to the rural counties when the work needs presence. Scoped in writing, fixed in fee where the boundary is clear, and measured against the interface or control it was meant to produce.
Does a BAA make us compliant? No. A BAA allocates liability; it does not implement a control. Many breaches happen inside a signed BAA because nobody verified what the counterpart actually did.
What is the minimum viable security programme for a small practice? A named security officer, an ePHI map, encryption at rest and in transit, unique accounts with MFA, audit logging that is actually retained, a tested restore, and a written incident procedure. That list is small and it is not optional.
How often should access be reviewed? At minimum on a fixed schedule and on every termination. The failures I find most often are accounts that survived a departure and integrations still holding credentials for systems that were retired.
Working with organisations across Salt Lake City and the surrounding area — on site, remote, or both.
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