HIPAA security failures are rarely exotic. They are encryption that was planned and not applied to one store, logging that proves nothing, and an access review nobody runs.
The technical safeguards are small in number and specific: access control, audit controls, integrity, person or entity authentication, and transmission security. What makes an organisation fail is not misunderstanding them but applying them unevenly — the production database encrypted, the analytics snapshot not; the application logging every read, the batch job writing to a share with no audit trail at all.
I start with the data map, because every other control depends on it. Where is ePHI stored, who can read it, what copies exist, which ones are backed up and which are simply forgotten. In practice a mid-sized practice finds between five and fifteen stores it did not know were holding patient data, and every one of them is outside the controls the rest of the estate has.
The second pass is evidence. An auditor does not want a policy that says access is reviewed quarterly; they want the review record. Any control that cannot produce a record is treated as not implemented, which is the honest reading of the rule and the one that survives an investigation.
fixed-scope work with a written output. Assessment first, then a sequence of changes, with the criteria for each step agreed in advance so the outcome is measurable rather than asserted.
The common failure is a control that exists in a policy and not in the estate. The policy says backups are encrypted; one nightly export lands on an unencrypted share. Nobody knows because nobody tests the control after it is written.
Engagements run statewide from Las Vegas: Reno, Sparks, Carson City and the rural counties, where a critical-access hospital often has one IT director covering infrastructure, security and the EHR. Remote delivery is the default; travel is done when the work genuinely needs a room with the people in it. Statewide work usually involves the state Medicaid programme, which changes the interface requirements materially compared with commercial payers.
Scope is a sequence of work with a measurable acceptance criterion per step. Each step is signed off before the next begins.
Charles Trinh works from Las Vegas, Nevada and delivers remotely across the United States. Engagements are scoped in writing, fixed in fee where possible, and measured against the interface or control they were meant to produce. Where the work touches patient data, the data-handling terms are agreed before access is granted.
Does a BAA make us compliant? No. A BAA allocates liability; it does not implement a control. Many breaches happen inside a signed BAA because nobody verified what the counterpart actually did.
What is the minimum viable security programme for a small practice? A named security officer, an ePHI map, encryption at rest and in transit, unique accounts with MFA, audit logging that is actually retained, a tested restore, and a written incident procedure. That list is small and it is not optional.
How often should access be reviewed? At minimum on a fixed schedule and on every termination. The failures I find most often are accounts that survived a departure and integrations still holding credentials for systems that were retired.
What does this engagement produce? A written design or assessment tied to a specific interface, control or revenue workflow, with the evidence behind each finding.
How is it delivered? Remotely, with a scope call first and a fixed fee agreed before work begins.
Working with organisations across Nevada and the surrounding area — on site, remote, or both.